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Allocation of effort across countermeasures.
So seek “cost – effectiveness” of CMs.
But what is “effectiveness”? = Reduction of Risk
But:
As implement a countermeasure,
population of adversaries adapts (maybe):
- changes targets
- changes weapon
- changes tactics
What does not change?: - Adversary values
- Adversary decision behavior
What We Are Trying to Capture
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So It’s Essentially
a Dual Decision Tree Problem, But:
1984:
US USSR
2006:
US
Many Different Adversary Trees
Information
re p’s, values
Information
re p’s, values
Information
re p’s, values
Information
re p’s, values
Slide 4Adversary Modeling
“Countermeasures” covers:
- Prevention
- Hardening
- Detection
- Response
And Another Thing to Capture
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“Countermeasures” covers:
- Reduce Adversary Incentives to Attack
- Prevention
- Hardening
- Detection
- Response: - Response Effectiveness
- Response Resilience
- Societal Expectations
- National Political/Operational Reactions/Costs
- Ultimate Societal Values, e.g., “England’s Finest Hour”
And Another Thing to Capture
But really:But really:
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So there’s much more to the strategy.
So “cost – effectiveness”
must be based on a “yardstick”
that applies consistently
across those CM effects/types
And Another Thing to Capture
“Countermeasures” covers:
- Reduce Adversary Incentives to Attack
- Prevention
- Hardening
- Detection
- Response: - Response Effectiveness
- Response Resilience
- Societal Expectations
- National Political/Operational Reactions/Costs
- Ultimate Societal Values, e.g., “England’s Finest Hour”
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How Countermeasures Reduce Risk
Countermeasure: reducesprobability2(succ|attempt)
reduces
consequences
and
/or
which in turn reduces
the overall attractiveness
of the scenario
to the adversary,
which in turn:
reduces
probability1(adv selects)
so a countermeasure reduces the risk of a scenario in 2 or 3 ways
though that benefit is “capped” by the fact that
the adversary can choose a different scenario,
that was previously less attractive to him
R(scenario) = probability1(adv selects) l probability2(succ|att) l U(conseq’s)
Risk of a
scenario = · ·
Likelihood
it is selected
by the adversary
(est’d by US)
(probability
or an index
reflecting that)
Likelihood
the attack
is successful
given the attack
(est’d by US)
(conditional probability,
i.e., p(success|attack)
or an index reflecting that)
Index of
severity of
consequences
(est’d by US)
(multiattribute
utility)
Operator that combines the indices in a metrically appropriate way.
If indices are probabilities, this would be a multiplication.
If the indices are more general indices, this would be a table
relating two index values to a single combined index value.
As before.  If likelihood index is a probability
and severity a utility, this would be a multiplication.
(index, presented here
in a simple form.
Could be presented
as a convolution
over distributions.)
Adversary Choice Model
Likelihood
the attack
is successful
given the attack
(US est of
adversary’s
judgment)
(conditional probability,
i.e., p(success|attack)
or an index reflecting that)
Index of
attractiveness
to adversary
of attack mode
(est’d by US)
(multiattribute
utility)
Index of
attractiveness
to adversary
of consequences
(est’d by US)
(multiattribute
utility)
can be
simply
judgments
of
strategic
-level
red team,
or
p(succ|attack)
index
combined with
MAU
(attack mode,
consequences)
(or all three elements can be
simply rolled into overall judgments)
Intell: CapabilityIntell: Capability Intell: Adversary PreferenceIntell: Adversary Preference Intell: CapabilityIntell: Capability
Consequence
Assessment,
Evaluation
Consequence
Assessment,
Evaluation
Figure A1.  Overall logic of outline methodology Slide 8Adversary Modeling
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An Inference Structure
Populations
of Adversaries
·
·
·
for each population,
over attacks:
p(succ|attack),
MAU(consequences
of attack)
for each population:
choice behavior,
frequency of attack
for each pop’n:
choice of attack,
frequency
tally
over
pop’n’s,
summing
for each
attack
Relative
Frequency
of
Attacks
Fully Disaggregated Judgments:
adversary population list
for each population: capability
values, choice behavior
frequency of attack
Fully
Aggregated
Judgments
or just skip
all to the left
and elicit:
Basic Principle:  Push as far to the left as you can.
A list? Or: Agent-Based Modeling.  Talking with John Hiles, NPS
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Model Requirements
Must evaluate CMs in the context of a Game Against the Adversary:
Capture that:
- the adversary shifts his attacks in response to CMs
(else will overestimate risk reduction of a CM)
- the adversary has preferences and chooses
(account for his values, his choice behavior)
- MAUadv ¹ MAUus,  predictive vs evaluative, respectively
- padv(succ|attack) ¹ pUS(success|attack),
predictive vs evaluative, respectively
Can do that with MAU modeling,
not counting on adversary actually behaving strictly that way,
but using MAU as a noisy predictive guide.
So in fact:  MAU plus probabilistic choice model.
Model Requirements: Address Problem:
Coverage of Scenario Space
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Any finite list of scenarios only addresses a small part of the scenario space.
Here are 15 of them:
How do you establish preparedness for scenarios “not on the list”?
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
· ·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
· ·
Call them “Design Basis Threats.” Still the same problem.
Adversary Modeling
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You can “genericize” each scenario, to “smear it out” over more space:
But then each scenario is too unspecified to calculate consequences.
Once you make a scenario specific enough to calculate consequences,
it covers very little scenario space.
Shifting from scenarios to countermeasures does not solve the problem:
Measuring countermeasure effectiveness still requires calculating
consequences of scenarios, without, then with, the countermeasure.
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
· ·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
· ·
Adversary Modeling
Model Requirements: Address Problem:
Coverage of Scenario Space
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The Challenge, Basic Approach
The analysis structure is not the challenge – that is “easily” sketched.
The challenge and the approach:
- the information exists in experts’ heads;
- the challenge is in getting it out of those heads, and
- that challenge is met by structuring the problem,
developing the models and coefficients,
then expertly eliciting them.
And so, key line of investigation is:
What information can be elicited how from whom,
on: - adversary MAU attributes
- adversary perceived probabilities
- adversary choice behavior
(how identify alternatives, list them, choose among them)
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MARS / NEXIIS
The Model / The Program
MARS:  Modeling the Adversary for Responsive Strategy
NEXIIS:  National Enterprise
(X)Crossing Intelligence with Infrastructure Systems
Nexus = a means of connection, a link or tie,
a place where two systems interlace into a single system
Mars = the Roman god of war
And So We Can Now Name
The Approach:
Overall Structure of MARS
3
1
6
4
7
5
2
Adversaries
each a
choosing/acting
agent,
with goals, values,
choice behavior,
information,
capabilities
(after countermeasures)
c
a fd
j e
b
Targets
each with
p(consequences|attack)s
(after countermeasures)
over ranges of
capabilities, attacks
g
Possible Attacks
each with an
adversary –
target pair,
probability
per year
probability
distribution
over
consequences,
p per year
Output:
i k
h
3
1
6
4
7
5
2
Adversary Model Loaders
c
a fd
j e
bg
i k
h
Target Model Loaders
Adversary Model Inputs
goals, values,
choice behavior,
information,
capabilities
(after countermeasures)
Target Model Inputs
p(consequences|attack)s
(after countermeasures)
over ranges of
capabilities, attacks
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Model
runs
over
uncertainties
single
numeraire:
subjective
expected
multiattribute
utility
(of consequences
to the US,
values of the US)
for the
Input Data Set
Adversary Modeling
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Inputs – Outputs Structure
Adversary Model Inputs
goals, values,
choice behavior,
information,
capabilities
(after countermeasures)
Target Model Inputs
p(consequences|attack)s
(after countermeasures)
over ranges of
capabilities, attacks
Output:
single numeraire:
subjective expected
multiattribute utility
(of consequences to the US,
values of the US)
for the
Input Data Set
The bulk of the adversary models built up over time into a database.
Gradually build up a “stable” of perhaps 20 adversary groups,
improving the model for each group as data becomes available.
Countermeasure Evaluation:
Load adversary choice/capability implications of the countermeasure.
Assume goals, values, choice behavior unchanged by countermeasure.
Then run MARS, compare output to baseline output.
The bulk of the target models built up over time into a database.
Gradually build up a “stable” of very many targets,
starting with generic target type groups, then getting more specific over time,
improving the model for each target/group as data becomes available.
Countermeasure Evaluation:
Load target p(consequences|attack)s implications of the countermeasure.
Then run MARS, compare output to baseline output.
The output numeraire, subjective expected multiattribute utility (SEMAU)
provides a metrically valid “yardstick”
for measuring the benefits of any countermeasure,
comparable across countermeasures.
Countermeasure evaluated by:
- loading adversary choice/behavior implications of the countermeasure
- loading target p(consequences|attack)s implications of the countermeasure
- running MARS with those loaded datasets, calculate SEMAU
- compare that with the baseline SEMAU.
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Details of MARS
After loading countermeasure implications (for adversary models, for target models):
Each Adversary Model conducts several steps in each run of the overall model:
Adversary: - acquires any incremental information being considered (once acquired, assume it stays)
- acquires any incremental capability being considered (once acquired, assume it stays)
- acquires a target-attack choice set, or modifications of its baseline choice set
- chooses a target-attack from that set
- launches that attack, at some probability per year based on propensity to attack per year
For that same run of the overall model, the attacked Target Model generates a consequence vector
based on its loaded p(consequences | attack, adversary capabilities, countermeasure).
Still being considered:  How best to model the several uncertainties involved in the above steps.
A “baseline” way to handle all of those uncertainties:
For any given countermeasure (loading its implications into the adversary and target models):
the MARS model is run many times, in a monte carlo fashion,
where the runs vary in instantiations of:
- a probabilistic increment-in-information model
- a probabilistic increment-in-capability model
- a probabilistic choice model, covering: - acquisition of a choice set of target-attacks
- choosing from among that set
- choosing to actually launch that attack
- p(consequences | attack, adversary capabilities, countermeasure) of the attacked target.
All runs can be normalized to a background propensity to attack per year.
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Another Mode of MARS:
Emergent Threat Time Series
MARS can just as easily be run with a fixed baseline set of countermeasures,
re-arranging the monte carlo calling program to run a series of time series
where at each time step the “dice is rolled” on:
- does each adversary group acquire an increment of information
(which then stays acquired)
- does each adversary group acquire an increment of capability
(which then stays acquired)
In that mode, MARS can paint out a “growth in risk over time” curve
for any given set of inputs re
- probability an increment in information
- probability an increment in capability
will be acquired per time period (and once acquired, stays).
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Improvement Over: “Scenarios”
The MARS model is an improvement over the use of “scenarios.”
“Scenarios,” in fact, do not exist.  They are a construct.
What exists, actually, in the real world, is what is shown on Slide 9:
- a population of adversary groups
- a population of targets
- information on adversary choice, capability, success and consequences
Like any good model, MARS structurally mimics reality.
Because of that, MARS cannot even represent a “scenario,”
since no such thing exists in reality.
If you still want to “risk prioritize” scenarios, it’s a stretch,
but you can do it with MARS, in the following steps:
- make the (bold) assumption that the “risk” of a scenario is the difference
between the overall risk faced by the US (SEMAU) in the baseline
minus the overall risk faced by the US (SEMAU) 
in a world where all consequences of that scenario are zeroed out.
- run MARS in those two modes (baseline and consequences zeroed)
- define the “risk” as the difference in those two runs in SEMAU.
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Improvement Over:
“Vulnerability Assessment”
MARS is an improvement over the use of “Vulnerability Assessments.”
VAs can misallocate resources by assessing the vulnerabilities of targets,
and prioritizing countermeasures based on:
- ease of attacking that target and
- the consequences of such an attack.
Two problems with that:
- because no thought is given to adversary choice,
VAs can recommend countermeasures (primarily hardening)
for cases that may be quite unlikely to be chosen by adversaries.
- effectiveness of countermeasures are over-estimated, since implicitly,
VAs assume that the countermeasure reduces overall risk
by reducing probability times consequence of that attack-target pair.
But in fact the adversary is apt to simply go elsewhere to attack.
Two problems with that:
- because no thought is given to adversary choice,
VAs can recommend countermeasures (primarily hardening)
for cases that may be quite unlikely to be chosen by adversaries.
- effectiveness of countermeasures are over-estimated, since implicitly,
VAs assume that the countermeasure reduces overall risk
by reducing probability times consequence of that attack-target pair.
But in fact the adversary is apt to simply go elsewhere to attack.
MARS evaluates countermeasures based on the strategic logic of Slide 9,
and so avoids both of those problems.
Restructuring MARS into Lists
Our pUS(adv will choose i) = 
MAUadv(attack 1)
SMAUadv(attack i)
i = 1, ni
Adversary
Group 1
20 attacks (target-weapons-tactics)
Decisions: - values1*
- capabilities1 p(consequences | attack,
capability,
CM)
for each attack:
Adversary
Group 2
The same 20 attacks
Decisions: - values2
- capabilities2
for each attack:
Adversary
Group 3
The same 20 attacks
Decisions: - values3
- capabilities3
for each attack:
Adversary
Group 20
The same 20 attacks
Decisions: - values4
- capabilities4
for each attack:
MAUUS
frequency
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SEMAUUS
= 320
with
CM
MAUUS
frequency
SEMAUUS
= 290
without
CM
So CM is “worth”
290    320 SEMAU,
equivalent to “$20B”
($ as relative scale,
metric = cardinal)
Load-and-run twice:
decision node
to the adversary
chance event node
to the US
*MAUadv(CEIFUD, embarrass USG, attack attributes, padv(success)
decision node
to the adversary
chance event node
to the US
decision node
to the adversary
chance event node
to the US
decision node
to the adversary
chance event node
to the US
“Scenario Generator”
(CM =
countermeasure)
(MAU =
multiattribute utility)(SEMAU =subjective expected MAU)
(20 bars for 20 attacks, + convolutions = more bars)
As a first approx:
p(consequences | attack,
capability,
CM)
p(consequences | attack,
capability,
CM)
p(consequences | attack,
capability,
CM)
(CM =
countermeasure)
1
1Casualties,
Economic Loss,
Icons,
Fear-Uncertainty-Doubt
·
··
·
Adversary Modeling
List-Wise MARS, detail 1
Adversary
Group 1
20 attacks (target-weapons-tactics)
Decisions: - values1*
- capabilities1 p(consequences | attack,
capability,
CM)
for each attack:
MAUUS
frequency
SEMAUUS
= 320
with
CM
MAUUS
frequency
SEMAUUS
= 290
without
CM
So CM is “worth”
290    320 SEMAU,
equivalent to “$20B”
($ as relative scale,
metric = cardinal)
Load-and-run twice:
decision node
to the adversary
chance event node
to the US
*MAUadv(CEIFUD, embarrass USG, attack attributes, padv(success)
(CM =
countermeasure)
(MAU =
multiattribute utility)(SEMAU =subjective expected MAU)
(20 bars for 20 attacks, + convolutions = more bars)
pUS(adv will choose i) = 
MAUadv(attack 1)
S MAUadv(attack i)i = 1, ni
As a first approx:
(CM =
countermeasure)
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The goal of the decision model
is to “automate” IC judgments 
This approximation “behaves well,”
but is decision-process nonsensical. 
Adversary Modeling
List-Wise MARS, detail 2
Adversary
Group 1
20 attacks (target-weapons-tactics)
Decisions: - values1*
- capabilities1 p(consequences | attack,
capability,
CM)
for each attack:
MAUUS
frequency
SEMAUUS
= 320
with
CM
MAUUS
frequency
SEMAUUS
= 290
without
CM
So CM is “worth”
290    320 SEMAU,
equivalent to “$20B”
($ as relative scale,
metric = cardinal)
Load-and-run twice:
decision node
to the adversary
chance event node
to the US
*MAUadv(CEIFUD, embarrass USG, attack attributes, padv(success)
(CM =
countermeasure)
(MAU =
multiattribute utility)(SEMAU =subjective expected MAU)
(20 bars for 20 attacks, + convolutions = more bars)
(CM =
countermeasure)
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Can run “contrasts”
to show how a CM reduces risk.
Can take derivatives
and draw conclusions:
- characterize best directions
for CM improvements
- demonstrate effectiveness of resilience
Adversary Modeling
Adversary Decision Modeling
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From before:  Can predict adversary choice with MAU modeling,
not counting on adversary actually behaving strictly that way,
but using MAU as a noisy predictive guide.
So in fact:  MAU plus probabilistic choice model.
Simply take past work in sensitivity analysis over weights,
and re-apply to propagate weight uncertainty into choice uncertainty.
But a problem:
What about an adversary that chooses based on dreams/visions?
Shouldn’t go full LaPlacian (equal probability of all alternatives),
but could go to a mix of decision models, one of which is LaPlacian.
Will use both standard and unique MAU elicitation, and SP elicitation, tools,
based on broad experience.
Adversary Modeling
First Step: Objectives Hierarchies
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further the goals of the adv Sharia Law
Caliphate
US/West Out of ….
~
(Exactly which goals,
in many cases,
doesn’t matter!)
change US policies that are in conflict
with those goals
weaken the will of the US
to project foreign policy
in general
weaken the will of the US
to project
specific foreign policy
“hurt the US”
in non-policy-specific ways
(e.g., 9-11)
“hurt the US”
in policy-specific ways
(e.g., Beirut barracks)
casualties economic
loss
icon FUD: fear-
uncertainty
-doubt
embarrass
USG
recruitment power,
standing
e.g.,
show weakness,
ineffectiveness
of CM, DHS
example:
not useful
for target
selection
unclear
usefulness
for domestic
target selection
possible
adversary attributes
for target selection:
MAUUS(adv), i.e., MAU of US in opinion of adv
causal links, loops
suggest go to
influence diagram
“CEIFUD”
Fundamental US objective: pursue policies with minimum impediment
Adversary Objectives HierarchiesAdversary Objectives Hierarchies
Adversary Modeling
First Step:  Influence Diagrams, Hybrid
Slide 26
Influence Diagram / Hybrid, Adversary-CentricInfluence Diagram / Hybrid, Adversary-Centric
goals of
the advUS policies in conflict
with those goalswill of the US
to project foreign policy
“hurt the US”
recruitment
“image,”
power,
standing
possible adversary attributes for target selection:
attack
consequences
C E I FUD emb
USG
attack
capability
to attack
adversary target choice
information on targets,
vulnerabilities after CMs
padv(succ)MAUadv(C,E,I,FUD,embUSG, adv image, adv recruitment)
Ý
MAUUS(adv), i.e., MAU of US in opinion of adv
causal links
-
+
-
Adversary Modeling
Causal Links Among Attributes
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possible adversary attributes for target selection:
padv(succ)MAUadv(C,E,I,FUD,embUSG, adv image, adv recruitment)  +  noise
MAUUS(adv), i.e., MAU of US in opinion of adv
causal links
I. From previous slide:  predictive adversary choice model, for pUS(attack)s
pUS(succ)MAUUS(C,E,I,FUD,embUSG, adv image, adv recruitment)  +  noise
MAUUS(adv), i.e., MAU of US in opinion of adv
causal links
II. Evaluative for US:
pUS(next attack)
indirect preferences:
US cares about these attributes because they
affect
p(next attack)
Causal links and indirect preferences make elicitation challenging.Causal links and indirect preferences make elicitation challenging.
Adversary Modeling
Seeking an Elegant Rendition
of Spectrum of Adversary Groups
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What matters to MARS/NEXIIS
is adversary groups with distinctly different values/decision behavior.
Adversary decision-behavior-distinct “agents,” “groups,”
perhaps let’s say 20 different ones,
i.e., 20 agents with distinct values/decision behavior,
are more stable than
actual adversary groups in real world (one estimate: 700+).
But then must treat each of those “groups”
with attack-generation frequencies
reflecting that each one represents a number of actual groups
Adversary Modeling
Adversary Values vs Capabilities
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Elicitations will find adversary group spectrum to lie somewhere on a range:Elicitations will find adversary group spectrum to lie somewhere on a range:
Groups’
values/decision behavior
is strategically the same,
(i.e., we can’t tell
any differences
well enough to elicit them
and use them reliably)
so groups 
only strategically vary
on capability.
Groups’
values/decision behavior
can be elicited as
different between groups,
in which case
capability differences
matter less,
though still matter.
Note:
Some groups may target
capability increases
based on their values/goals.
Adversary Modeling
What, Information-Wise, Do
Adversary Models Do, Actually?
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- they do not add information
- they organize information into modeling-useful “objects”
or agents with behavior patterns
- they help aggregate information, over time, about groups
- they help communicate information
Adversary Modeling
A Key Challenge:
Attack Frequency
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If fit attack frequency for each group
based on a base rate fit to the
observed frequency of domestic terrorist attacks
for the last five years,
that attack frequency will be quite low.
But we may have a nonstationarity problem.
So how do we set those frequencies?
Adversary Modeling
Restructuring MARS into Excel
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Intelligence
Values,
M&I
Intelligence
Capability
Stochastic
Choice
Model
Infrastructure Protection
pUS of consequences
given
attack, capability, CMs
1MAUFadv = f(consequence attributes, attack attributes, padv(success))
Policy
MAUFUS
2MAUFUS = f(consequence attributes)
Intelligence
Community
Intelligence
Community
Infrastructure Protection
Community
Infrastructure Protection
Community
Two Different Value ModelsTwo Different Value Models
3padv(success | attack, capability, CM)
Two Different ProbabilitiesTwo Different Probabilities
4pUS(conseq’s | attack, capability, CM)
Our pUS(adv will choose i) = 
MAUadv(attack 1)
SMAUadv(attack i)
i = 1, ni
NexusNexus
SEMAUUS(CM)
As a first approx:
1 1
3
24
attack
# Capability MAUadv(attack i) pUS(attack i) Capability MAUadv(attack i) pUS(attack i) pUS(consequences | attack,capab'y, CM) MAUUS(consequences)
1
2 Convolved to
3 frequency
4 distribution
5 over MAUUS
6
7 then
… Expectation
20 = SEMAUUS(CM)
Attack (target-weapons-tactics)Adversary Group 1, MAUFadv1 Adversary Group 2, MAUFadv2
Adversary Modeling
Excel-Wise MARS, detail 1
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Intelligence
Values,
M&I
Intelligence
Capability
Stochastic
Choice
Model
Infrastructure Protection
pUS of consequences
given
attack, capability, CMs
Policy
MAUFUS
Intelligence
Community
Intelligence
Community
Infrastructure Protection
Community
Infrastructure Protection
Community
Our pUS(adv will choose i) = 
MAUadv(attack 1)
SMAUadv(attack i)
i = 1, ni
NexusNexus
SEMAUUS(CM)
As a first approx:
1 1
24
attack
# Capability MAUadv(attack i) pUS(attack i) Capability MAUadv(attack i) pUS(attack i) pUS(consequences | attack,capab'y, CM) MAUUS(consequences)
1
2 Convolved to
3 frequency
4 distribution
5 over MAUUS
6
7 then
… Expectation
20 = SEMAUUS(CM)
Attack (target-weapons-tactics)Adversary Group 1, MAUFadv1 Adversary Group 2, MAUFadv2
Submodel:  CMs and their effectiveness:
- adversary capabilities
- CMs
- vulnerabilities
- targets as
consequence generators
- consequences
Integrative Function:  Has become a multi-Lab effort
Adversary Modeling
Excel-Wise MARS, detail 2
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Intelligence
Values,
M&I
Intelligence
Capability
Stochastic
Choice
Model
Infrastructure Protection
pUS of consequences
given
attack, capability, CMs
Policy
MAUFUS
1 1
24
attack
# Capability MAUadv(attack i) pUS(attack i) Capability MAUadv(attack i) pUS(attack i) pUS(consequences | attack,capab'y, CM) MAUUS(consequences)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
…
20
Attack (target-weapons-tactics)Adversary Group 1, MAUFadv1 Adversary Group 2, MAUFadv2
Integrative Function / Collective Function:Integrative Function / Collective Function:
Spreadsheet = a formally correct way to “dump in” whatever data is available, then seek more:
- enforcing consistency, pedigree, Quality Management
- building up a structured “landscape of risk”
- iterative, accumulation - of - knowledge, as data becomes available:
- adversary models
- infrastructure targets, vulnerabilities, pUS(consequences | attack, capab’y, CM)
- project - management advantages
Pedigree QM
Adversary Modeling
Excel-Wise MARS, detail 3
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Intelligence
Values,
M&I
Intelligence
Capability
Stochastic
Choice
Model
Infrastructure Protection
pUS of consequences
given
attack, capability, CMs
Policy
MAUFUS
1 1
24
attack
# Capability MAUadv(attack i) pUS(attack i) Capability MAUadv(attack i) pUS(attack i) pUS(consequences | attack,capab'y, CM) MAUUS(consequences)
1
2 Convolved to
3 frequency
4 distribution
5 over MAUUS
6
7 then
… Expectation
20 = SEMAUUS(CM)
Attack (target-weapons-tactics)Adversary Group 1, MAUFadv1 Adversary Group 2, MAUFadv2
One Form of Integration:  Prioritization Goes Both Ways Between IC and IPOne Form of Integration:  Prioritization Goes Both Ways Between IC and IP
IC => IP:  Countermeasure prioritization based on likelihood
IC <= IP:  Prioritization of groups/attacks based on the harm they could do
Adversary Modeling
Excel-Wise MARS, detail 4
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Intelligence
Values,
M&I
Intelligence
Capability
Stochastic
Choice
Model
Infrastructure Protection
pUS of consequences
given
attack, capability, CMs
Policy
MAUFUS
1 1
24
attack
# Capability MAUadv(attack i) pUS(attack i) Capability MAUadv(attack i) pUS(attack i) pUS(consequences | attack,capab'y, CM) MAUUS(consequences)
1
2 Convolved to
3 frequency
4 distribution
5 over MAUUS
6
7 then
… Expectation
20 = SEMAUUS(CM)
Attack (target-weapons-tactics)Adversary Group 1, MAUFadv1 Adversary Group 2, MAUFadv2
Two Different Value ModelsTwo Different Value Models Two Different ProbabilitiesTwo Different Probabilities
1MAUFadv = f(cons’q attr’s, attack attr’s, padv(succ)) 3padv(success | attack, capability, CM) to predict adv choice
2MAUFUS = f(cons’q attr’s) 4pUS(conseq’s | attack, capability, CM) to evaluate for US
Predictive,
Evaluative
Predictive,
Evaluative
Adversary Modeling
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Status
An LLNL Intelligence Working Group “Brain Trust”
is convening often to work out four sets of issues:
- availability of data
- most feasible structuring of adversary decisions, values and uncertainties
- most feasible structuring of adversary choice models
- feasibility of elicitation tools to elicit: - subjective probabilities
- adversary values, value tradeoffs
A joint-work contract is being developed with John Hiles,
key developer of Agent-Based Modeling,
currently a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.
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Strengths
• Decision analysis expertise, specifically with dual decision tree background
• Decision analysis expertise in elicitation of
decision models, subjective probabilities
• That expertise and intelligence community expertise
“under one roof” at LLNL
• Access to Capitol Area intelligence Community
• Access to, ongoing relationship with, John Hiles
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And an Ending Quote
"These complexities do not relieve humans
from the responsibility for making decisions...
aimed at navigating their organizations successfully through campaigns....
Minds must be prepared beforehand...
this preparation must be predicated on
the internalization of 'valid' knowledge about the conflict environment.“
Robert C. Rubel, Naval War College Review, Spring 2006, vol. 59, no. 2
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Appendix: Slides for Working With
Intelligence / M&I Working Group
Adversary Decisions: - What decisions? (within each group)
- Among what options?
- What can we know about them?
Adversary Values: - What motivation/intent factors?
- What objectives hierarchies?
- What attributes?
- What can we know about them?
Uncertainties in Adversaries’: - goals, values
- capabilities
- information
- choice behavior
(how list alternatives,
then how choose)
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We Can’t Avoid Modeling
Adversary Decision Behavior
So Key Questions:
What decisions does the adversary make?
Does one adversary (group) choose among scenarios?
On what attributes does he make those decisions?
What are the key uncertainties to capture?
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What Decisions
Does the Adversary Make?
Highly Speculative Adversary Decision SequenceHighly Speculative Adversary Decision Sequence
Decide Goals
(top row in goal hierarchy
(slides 11-12) is not a
decision, other rows are)
casualties
economics
icon
FUD
embarrass US
inflict sense of betrayal,
loss of trust
make an infrastructure
or industry look bad
demonstrate US fragility
demonstrate technical
skills of adversary
Decide Target
population hub
economic hub
icon
infrastructure
infrastructure
leverage point
for use as a weapon
vulnerability point,
opportunity
for particular goal
Decide Weapon
function of:
- goals
- target
- capabilities/
expertise/
resources
Decide Tactics
function of:
- all to left
- turn humans
- infiltrate
- disinformation
- home invasion
- etc.
Decide Alliances
Decide Acquisition
of Equipment
Decide Acquisition
of Expertise
Decide
Data Collection
Decide
Recruitment
Decide
Training, Drills
A
A
Are there IC experts
who can “stand in” for adversaries
and have these decision behaviors
elicited from them?
Who are they? - in LLNL
- Elsewhere
Are there IC experts
who can “stand in” for adversaries
and have these decision behaviors
elicited from them?
Who are they? - in LLNL
- Elsewhere
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If the Adversary Chooses Among Scenarios:
What Do Those Scenarios Look Like?  HSC 15
Cyber Attack15
Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease (Foot & Mouth)14
Biological Attack – Food Contamination13
Explosives Attack – Bombing Using IED12
Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices11
Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane10
Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake9
Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion8
Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent7
Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals6
Chemical Attack – Blister Agent5
Biological Attack – Plague4
Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza3
Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax2
Nuclear Detonation – 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device1
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INSIDER: Support staff (janitor, landscaper, etc) CYBER: Infiltration of a network from outside
Security staff Exfiltration of stored data
Technical or Administrative staff Corruption of stored data
Executive staff Rendering stored data inaccessible
BIO: Smallpox (contagious) Interception of data flows/communications
Anthrax (not contagious) Interruption of data flows/communications
Foot & mouth (livestock) Redirection of data flows/communications
Pathogen in food Malicious (untrusted) software agents
Soybean rust (crop) Compromised trusted software applications
Novel emerging pathogens (e.g., engineered organisms) Local disruption of services
CHEM: Toxic Industrial Chemical (external wide area) Widespread disruption of services
Chemical Warfare Agent (internal to facility) Compromised hardware components
Toxin in water system Compromised (hijacked) machines
RAD/NUKE: Source release or placement Networks of compromised machines
Radioactive Dispersal Device (explosive dispersal) PHYS ASS'LT: Small team with weapons (less than 10 people)
Improvised Nuclear Device Large team with weapons (10 or more people)
Nuclear weapon Vehicle
EXPLOSIVES: Small clandestine charges EMERGING: EMP, high-power microwave, directed energy devices
Bomb on person NATURAL Major storm (hurricane, set of tornados, snow/ice storm)
Bomb in vehicle DISASTERS Major earthquake
Projectile with charge (RPG, mortar, small rocket, MANPAD) + OTHER Major wildfire
Incendiary devices EMERGENCIES: Major accident (power plant, chemical plant, etc)
If the Adversary Chooses Among Scenarios:
What Do Those Scenarios Look Like?  Other 44
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Motivation & Intent Structure
From CIT Monterey Workshop
- FUD (bombs in shopping malls, MANPADs) 2, 6
- “Crusade:” foment Christian/Moslem conflict 3, 5
- Undermine US alliances 4, 6
- Economic hits (price, scarcity) 1, 6
1. 3 NG pipelines from Canada
2. bombs in many shopping malls, with webcams, spread all over US
3. sustained attack on mosques in US
4. UN attack (Lehay will do a note)
5. sustained Europe attacks alternating churches and mosques
6. sustained MANPADs on US planes in and out of Paris
7. Info campaign: take credit for 1, 6; deception 2,3,5; blame Christian Fund’sts 4.
Sharia Law
GSPC Caliphate power vacuum
and so how do that: 
undermine US
undermine France, pro-western powers, Saudi-like states
<=<=
<=
<=
One example scenario developed in a breakout groupOne example scenario developed in a breakout group
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Adversary Value Attributes
Consequence Attributes Attack Attributes
- fatalities, injuries
- economic loss
- icons
- general FUD
- get US/West out of …
- sense of betrayal, loss of trust
- FUD due to infra as weapon
- embarrass “hi-tech” society,
that “hi-tech” used against it
- Demo fragility of US society
- Make an infra look bad
- Demo tech skills of the adversary
- violent/not
- covert/overt
- suicide/not
- attribution direct-clear/not
- turn humans
- sleepers
- any of 10 ways to use
infra as a weapon
Green = attribute sets/values
found in brainstorming workshop
Which of these are “capturable:”
- have some idea that adversaries
value them.
- have some information such that
a person/panel (IC experts)
can “stand in” for an adversary
and have values elicited.
Which of these are “capturable:”
- have some idea that adversaries
value them.
- have some information such that
a person/panel (IC experts)
can “stand in” for an adversary
and have values elicited.
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And Finally:  Uncertainties
Sequence of uncertainties
standing between us and predicting adversary choice:
Our uncertainties in: - adversary values, goals
- adversary capabilities
- adversary information
- adversary choice behavior
(how assembles list of alternatives,
how then chooses among them)
Intrinsic noise:
Adversary is probably inherently not a fully consistent
subjective expected multiattribute utility maximizer.
Deliberate noise:
Adversary could transmit disinformation re intent, etc.
From whom can I “capture” these:
- have some information such that a person/panel (IC experts)
can have subjective probabilities elicited.
From whom can I “capture” these:
- have some information such that a person/panel (IC experts)
can have subjective probabilities elicited.
